Supplementary materials for article

"Political Expression and Action on Social Media: Exploring the Relationship between Lower- and Higher-Threshold Political Activities among Twitter Users in Italy"

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Appendix 1 – Dependent variable: E-mailing politicians, Model 1 (H1 and H2)

	Log-odds	s.e.	p	exp(B)	95% CI for exp(B)		99% CI for exp(B)	
					min	max	min	max
Political info from social media	.296	.427	.489	1.344	.581	3.109	.446	4.052
Online political expression	.555	.067	.000	1.742	1.527	1.986	1.465	2.070
Political info from newspapers	.043	.281	.879	1.043	.602	1.810	.506	2.153
Political info from radio	-.120	.259	.643	.887	.533	1.475	.454	1.732
Political info from television	-.307	.310	.322	.735	.400	1.354	.329	1.644
Interest in politics	1.965	.469	.000	7.138	2.836	17.967	2.116	24.078
“People don't have any say”	.198	.272	.467	1.219	.714	2.083	.602	2.469
“Public officials don’t care”	.573	.301	.057	1.773	.982	3.203	.814	3.864
“Politics is too complicated”	.152	.239	.524	1.165	.728	1.864	.627	2.162
Gender (male)	.389	.180	.031	1.475	1.036	2.101	.926	2.350
Age	2.701	.453	.000	14.901	6.122	36.270	4.626	47.999
Education	-.186	.546	.733	.830	.285	2.421	.203	3.392
Income	.222	.328	.500	1.248	.654	2.383	.532	2.928
Constant	-5.958	.644	.000	.003	.001	.009	.000	.014
N	1166							
Nagelkerke R^2	.289							
Log-likelihood	1107.1							

Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables apart from online political expression range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.

Appendix 2 – Dependent variable: E-mailing politicians, Model 2 (RQ)

	Log-odds	s.e.	p	exp(B)	95% CI for exp(B)		99% CI for exp(B)	
					min	max	min	max
High posting, high reading (a)	.858	.191	.000	2.358	1.618	3.437	1.435	3.875
High posting, low reading (b)	.866	.228	.000	2.377	1.518	3.723	1.317	4.291
Low posting, high reading (c)	-.346	.279	.215	.707	.409	1.223	.344	1.453
Political info from newspapers	-.062	.272	.819	.940	.551	1.604	.465	1.899
Political info from radio	-.047	.245	.847	.954	.589	1.544	.506	1.798
Political info from television	-.329	.290	.258	.720	.406	1.275	.339	1.529
Interest in politics	2.230	.446	.000	9.300	3.866	22.374	2.927	29.547
“People don't have any say”	.379	.248	.127	1.460	.897	2.377	.770	2.771
“Public officials don’t care”	.409	.282	.148	1.505	.864	2.621	.725	3.126
“Politics is too complicated”	.121	.223	.586	1.129	.729	1.749	.635	2.007
Gender (male)	.431	.172	.012	1.538	1.098	2.155	.988	2.396
Age	2.391	.423	.000	10.926	4.772	25.017	3.678	32.461
Education	.192	.518	.711	1.212	.439	3.348	.318	4.612
Income	-.075	.310	.810	.928	.504	1.709	.415	2.076
Constant	-4.506	.523	.000	.011	.004	.031	.003	.043
N	1221							
Nagelkerke R^2	.229							
Log-likelihood	1224.3							

Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.

Appendix 3 – Dependent variable: Campaigning on Social Media, Model 1 (H1 and H2)

	Log-odds	s.e.	p	exp(B)	95% CI for exp(B)		99% CI for exp(B)	
					min	max	min	max
Political info from social media	1.129	.398	.005	3.093	1.412	6.774	1.100	8.693
Online political expression	.729	.065	.000	2.073	1.823	2.357	1.751	2.455
Political info from newspapers	-.260	.274	.345	.771	.450	1.322	.380	1.566
Political info from radio	-.677	.255	.008	.508	.308	.839	.263	.983
Political info from television	.632	.290	.030	1.881	1.063	3.327	.888	3.984
Interest in politics	1.621	.399	.000	5.056	2.313	11.050	1.809	14.132
“People don't have any say”	.196	.248	.428	1.217	.748	1.979	.642	2.306
“Public officials don’t care”	.610	.272	.025	1.841	1.080	3.138	.913	3.711
“Politics is too complicated”	.378	.226	.095	1.460	.936	2.277	.813	2.621
Gender (male)	.375	.162	.021	1.456	1.059	2.001	.957	2.213
Age	-.502	.445	.259	.605	.253	1.449	.192	1.908
Education	.106	.545	.846	1.112	.379	3.260	.269	4.598
Income	.229	.295	.437	1.258	.705	2.243	.588	2.692
Constant	-5.413	.604	.000	.004	.001	.015	.001	.022
N	1162							
Nagelkerke R^2	.370							
Log-likelihood	1222.0							

Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables apart from online political expression range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.

Appendix 4 – Dependent variable: Campaigning on Social Media, Model 2 (RQ)

	Log-odds	s.e.	p	exp(B)	95% CI for exp(B)		99% CI for exp(B)	
					min	max	min	max
High posting, high reading (a)	1.081	.165	.000	2.946	2.129	4.076	1.922	4.516
High posting, low reading (b)	1.095	.208	.000	2.989	1.986	4.497	1.747	5.114
Low posting, high reading (c)	-.282	.216	.191	.754	.494	1.152	.432	1.316
Political info from newspapers	-.363	.255	.156	.696	.421	1.149	.359	1.346
Political info from radio	-.549	.226	.016	.578	.370	.901	.322	1.037
Political info from television	.536	.275	.053	1.709	.992	2.943	.833	3.504
Interest in politics	1.950	.373	.000	7.026	3.379	14.609	2.682	18.407
“People don't have any say”	.575	.220	.009	1.777	1.154	2.734	1.008	3.131
“Public officials don’t care”	.269	.242	.267	1.308	.814	2.102	.701	2.440
“Politics is too complicated”	.285	.204	.162	1.329	.892	1.982	.786	2.248
Gender (male)	.480	.150	.001	1.616	1.205	2.167	1.099	2.377
Age	-.228	.411	.580	.796	.355	1.787	.274	2.310
Education	.835	.503	.099	2.305	.853	6.234	.620	8.579
Income	.057	.273	.834	1.059	.619	1.813	.522	2.149
Constant	-3.435	.438	.000	.032	.014	.076	.010	.100
N	1220							
Nagelkerke R^2	.253							
Log-likelihood	1421.4							

Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.

Appendix 5 – Dependent variable: Attend offline event after receiving an online invitation, Model 1 (H1 and H2)

	Log-odds	s.e.	p	exp(B)	95% CI for exp(B)		99% CI for exp(B)	
					min	max	min	max
Political info from social media	1.055	.399	.008	2.873	1.313	6.287	1.026	8.046
Online political expression	.626	.065	.000	1.870	1.645	2.125	1.579	2.214
Political info from newspapers	.959	.274	.000	2.609	1.524	4.466	1.286	5.293
Political info from radio	-.092	.251	.714	.912	.558	1.493	.477	1.744
Political info from television	-.584	.283	.039	.558	.320	.971	.269	1.157
Interest in politics	1.924	.441	.000	6.845	2.864	16.362	2.167	21.625
“People don't have any say”	.962	.271	.001	2.617	1.530	4.477	1.287	5.323
“Public officials don’t care”	.090	.277	.745	1.094	.636	1.883	.536	2.234
“Politics is too complicated”	-.221	.224	.324	.801	.516	1.244	.449	1.430
Gender (male)	.069	.162	.667	1.072	.781	1.472	.706	1.627
Age	.561	.450	.213	1.752	.723	4.246	.546	5.623
Education	-.739	.512	.149	.478	.175	1.304	.128	1.788
Income	-.147	.308	.632	.863	.471	1.582	.388	1.917
Constant	-5.050	.537	.000	.006	.002	.018	.002	.026
N	1164							
Nagelkerke R^2	.335							
Log-likelihood	1213.9							

Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables apart from online political expression range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.

Appendix 6 – Dependent variable: Attend offline event after receiving an online invitation, Model 2 (RQ)

	Log-odds	s.e.	p	exp(B)	95% CI for exp(B)		99% CI for exp(B)	
					min	max	min	max
High posting, high reading (a)	1.074	.175	.000	2.928	2.075	4.133	1.860	4.610
High posting, low reading (b)	.787	.221	.000	2.197	1.422	3.395	1.238	3.900
Low posting, high reading (c)	-.208	.230	.367	.812	.517	1.276	.449	1.471
Political info from newspapers	.713	.254	.005	2.039	1.239	3.357	1.058	3.929
Political info from radio	-.010	.226	.963	.990	.636	1.540	.553	1.770
Political info from television	-.370	.263	.160	.691	.413	1.157	.351	1.361
Interest in politics	1.969	.409	.000	7.162	3.199	16.031	2.474	20.731
“People don't have any say”	1.200	.252	.000	3.319	2.017	5.463	1.717	6.414
“Public officials don’t care”	.072	.255	.777	1.075	.652	1.773	.557	2.075
“Politics is too complicated”	-.201	.213	.346	.818	.539	1.243	.472	1.418
Gender (male)	.243	.154	.114	1.275	.943	1.725	.857	1.897
Age	.714	.444	.112	2.043	.843	4.949	.632	6.604
Education	.137	.480	.775	1.147	.447	2.941	.332	3.957
Income	-.218	.291	.454	.804	.453	1.426	.378	1.711
Constant	-3.544	.453	.000	.029	.012	.070	.009	.093
N	1216							
Nagelkerke R^2	.245							
Log-likelihood	1363.1							

Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.

Appendix 7 – Odds-ratios for engagement in different types of online political activities, with "posting" and "reading" categories based on mean values and the midway point in the scale (50) as cutoff points.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES:	**Emailing politicians**		**Campaigning on social media**		**Attend offline event after receiving online invitation**	
	Mean	**Midway point**	**Mean**	**Midway point**	**Mean**	**Midway point**
High posting, high reading (a)	2.275**	2.015**	2.813**	2.540**	2.929**	2.755**
High posting, low reading (b)	2.202**	2.683**	2.898**	2.759**	2.184**	2.791**
Low posting, high reading (c)	.641	.914	.745	.864	.778	.973
Political info from newspapers	.940	.981	.702	.721	2.070**	2.101**
Political info from radio	.972	1.043	.593*	.643	1.012	1.084
Political info from television	.716	.709	1.700	1.708	.679	.679
Interest in politics	9.317**	10.195**	7.119**	8.210**	7.133**	7.642**
"People don't have any say"	1.465	1.524	1.776**	1.822**	3.303**	3.389**
"Public officials don't care"	1.523	1.484	1.342	1.318	1.104	1.086
"Politics is too complicated"	1.134	1.063	1.332	1.248	.807	.765
Gender (male)	1.520*	1.562*	1.603**	1.656**	1.250	1.283
Age	10.426**	10.976**	.778	.776	2.017	2.017
Education	1.203	1.229	2.193	2.300	1.107	1.183
Income	.964	.961	1.097	1.099	.838	.841
Constant	.012**	.011**	.033**	.031**	.030**	.028**
N	1221	1221	1220	1220	1216	1216
Nagelkerke R^2	.228	.220	.249	.231	.247	.239
Log-likelihood	1225.1	1233.0	1426.4	1446.2	1361.4	1370.3

Cell entries are odds-ratios for the predicted outcomes. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.
**p≤.01 *p≤.05 (based on 99% and 95% confidence intervals for exp(b) coefficients)

Appendix 8 – Odds-ratios for engagement in different types of online political activities, with "Low posting, low reading" set as the reference category of the independent variable

DEPENDENT VARIABLES:	**Emailing politicians**	**Campaigning on social media**	**Attend offline event after receiving online invitation**
High posting, high reading (a)	3.333**	3.907**	3.604**
High posting, low reading (b)	3.360**	3.964**	2.704**
Low posting, low reading (d)	1.413	1.326	1.231
Political info from newspapers	.940	.696	2.039**
Political info from radio	.954	.578*	.990
Political info from television	.720	1.709	.691
Interest in politics	9.300**	7.026**	7.162**
"People don't have any say"	1.460	1.777**	3.319**
"Public officials don't care"	1.505	1.308	1.075
"Politics is too complicated"	1.129	1.329	.818
Gender (male)	1.538*	1.616**	1.275
Age	10.926**	.796	2.043
Education	1.212	2.305	1.147
Income	.928	1.059	.804
Constant	.008**	.024**	.023**
N	1221	1220	1216
Nagelkerke R^2	.229	.253	.245
Log-likelihood	1224.3	1421.4	1363.2

Cell entries are odds-ratios for the predicted outcomes. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table.
All variables range from 0-1.
Coefficients for efficacy represent disagreement with statements in quotation marks.
**p≤.01 *p≤.05 (based on 99% and 95% confidence intervals for exp(b) coefficients)